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In recent decades, interest in the history and philosophy of the natural sciences has 
increased significantly. This interest has made scholars aware of the existing knowledge 
gap in these areas and has brought a kind of ‘pressure’ for more articles and books on the 
subject.  Indeed, it also motivates academics to start new projects related to these disci-
plines. Volumes like this are much needed for scholars in the field, given the high amount 
of information they contain. 
This rich volume aims at stimulating the field by presenting current research papers 
on Avicenna’s influence on the fields of physics and cosmology. In order to achieve this 
goal, this work contains thirteen articles related to the reception of the Persian philoso-
pher’s thought in these areas in the Middle Ages. The book revolves around the three 
different languages and cultures which were crucial for the reception of Avicenna’s 
thought. Hence, the volume is arranged in three main sections focusing on the Arabic, 
Hebrew and Latin traditions. It also contains an Index of Avicenna’s Works with Passages Cited 
and an Index of Names.  
The introduction is rather short compared to other sections of the book. It covers the 
general topics presented in the volume. The first six chapters deal with the Arabic tradi-
tion; the next two have to do with the Hebrew reception of Avicenna, and the last five 
analyse the Latin reception of Avicenna’s physics and cosmology. 
In the first chapter, Jon McGinnis examines the reception of Avicenna’s theory of mo-
tion in the Post-Classical Islamic World. In his analysis, McGinnis compares Avicenna’s al-
Shifa’ and al-Isharat. He claims that al-Isharat, was the primary vehicle for the transmission 
of Avicennian natural philosophy in the Mashriq, and thus the most important Avi-
cennian work in the eastern part of the Arabic-writing world. 
McGinnis suggests that in the Isharat Avicenna shifts from kinematics (the study of 
motion) to dynamics (the study of force) because he was addressing a different audience. 
For this remark, he refers to Dimitri Gutas’s observation that Avicenna’s audience for Isha-
rat may have been the mutakallimun, not the falasifa. This would explain why Avicenna 
initiated Isharat by discussing the body (ǧism) rather than nature and motion. Indeed, if 
Avicenna was writing for the mutakallimun, this would give a hint as to why he left nature 
and motion unstudied in this work, since these notions were criticized by some muta-
kallimun regarding causation. After citing al-Abhari’s Hidayat al-Hikma, the important 
madrasa text which was built on an account of Isharat, McGinnis provides al-Abhari’s and 
RESEÑAS                                                                                                                                          193 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval, 27/2 (2020), ISSN: 1133-0902, pp. 192-197 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21071/refime.v27i2.13133 
Avicenna’s almost identical definitions of motion. McGinnis states that, unlike Avicenna, 
al-Abhari thought that the definition of motion was not necessarily circular. This can be 
explained by the fact that he was not reading the Shifa but Isharat, as well as works of Abu 
al-Barakat (p. 15). However, Avicenna’s gloss could be subject to the same criticism, con-
cludes McGinnis: apparently, the sophisticated account of motion was replaced with a 
simpler one in Isharat. Aside from the notions of motion and time, the author also touches 
upon the difference between fact (inna) and reason (lima), for which he refers to Kitab al-
Burhan III. 3. I would nonetheless highlight the importance of Isharat IX. 5 as a passage in 
this respect.  
McGinnis continues his exposition with another milestone, Mulla Sadra, who re-
peated al-Abhari’s definition of motion as something gradually emerging from potency 
to act. Mulla Sadra also established two different senses of motion relying on Avicennian 
temporal theory, i.e., haraka tawassutiyya (used to define time) and haraka qatiyya (defined 
by time). The author also traces Avicenna’s influence to Fadl-i Haqq Hayrabadi (d. 1861), 
one of the last representatives of the Tabiiyyat Tradition. McGinnis characterises him as 
a flatfooted thinker who did not appreciate his predecessors, since according to him 
counting time is something known by everybody, and so there is no need to define it. In 
the final paragraph, McGinnis’s concluding remarks include that Avicenna’s distinction 
between mental and extra-mental existence is something we can extract from his account 
of motion. In my opinion, there will be more papers in future concerning the physical (or 
natural) topics in the Avicennian tradition.  
The second chapter on the Arabic reception of Avicenna is authored by Dimitri Gutas, 
who focuses on a special phrase: al-Hikma al-Mutaaliya. He begins by pointing out that this 
sentence is only used in the Isharat, whereas it is missing in Avicenna’s later works. Ac-
cording to Gutas, this sentence has been repeatedly misunderstood. To show this, he pro-
vides several examples of mistranslations of «al-hikma al-mutaaliya», including Spanish 
and French ones.1 According to Gutas, the passage where Avicenna uses hikma al-mutaali 
has syntactical, lexical and textual problems. Regarding the syntax, he notes that it was 
already adequately explained by Razi and Tusi. Gutas also mentions two lexical problems 
which change the meaning of the sentence. Yet given the difficulty of transferring 
thoughts into words, this should not surprise us. Regarding the textual problems, Gutas 
emphasizes the need for a critical edition of Isharat which separates the direct transmis-
sion of the text and the lemmata embedded in Tusi’s commentary. In the remaining pages 
of this chapter, Gutas examines the similarities and the differences between Razi’s and 
Tusi’s reception al-hikma al-mutaaliya. He concludes by remarking that it is by means of 
studies on the reception and interpretation of Avicennian thought that we obtain the best 
chart for the development of philosophy in the Mashriq. 
                                                      
1 I would like to add that in the Turkish translation of Isharat, the correspondent phrase «aşkın 
hikmet» can be translated in English as «transcendent wisdom» as well, which fits with the use that 
Mulla Sadra or Ibrahim Kalın made of it. 
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The third and the fourth chapters examine topics discussed by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, 
one of the most famous figures among the followers of Avicenna. In the third chapter, 
Jules Janssens discusses Avicennian elements present in some special topics of al-Razi’s 
al-Mabahit al-Mashriqiyya regarding place, void and directions. Janssens investigates Chap-
ters 16 to 24 in the light of a comparative method with which he contrasts some parts of 
the Mabahit and the Sama. Then – line by line – he shows the parallels in the arguments 
and in the wording. Janssens highlights that al-Razi combined two arguments of Avicenna 
into one.2 In order to argue for his method, Janssens uses Avicenna’s Sama, Naǧat, and 
Isharat. Janssens’s method may be useful in answering two questions, namely: 1) how and 
what al-Razi commented on among Avicenna’s arguments; and 2) when it comes to natu-
ral philosophy, what was followed (and how) in the later Islamic tradition. However, there 
is a question which is left open in his conclusions and it is a very important one, the type 
of question of the sort of «what is what?».  
The second chapter on al-Razi is by Peter Adamson, who begins with the existence of 
time in Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's al-Matalib al-Aliya. Adamson indicates that philosophers are 
largely unaware of the work of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a view I disagree with, at least regard-
ing Turkish academia. However, I agree with him on the issue that there is an immense 
need for translations and editions, which is also the case for many historical texts. Ad-
amson focuses on the treatment of time in Matalib, and traces al-Razi’s arguments in 
Matalib to Avicenna’s Naǧat and Physics. Adamson also outlines the arguments on time in 
al-Matalib al-Aliya as an appendix of his chapter. This chapter (Ch. 4) together with the 
previous one (Ch. 3) and the next one (Ch. 5) establish a methodological and epistemolog-
ical foundation for an investigation into the Arabic reception of Avicenna’s notions of 
place, void, and time, and whether they are dependent on the mind. These three chapters, 
in my opinion, also constitute the core of the volume’s section dealing with the Arabic 
reception of Avicenna. It is thanks to these contributions that we are able to read about 
an interpretation of medieval Arabic philosophy which discusses time, its real or mental 
existence, and its priority or posteriority to motion.  
Andreas Lammer contributes a chapter, which is almost equal in size to the two pre-
ceding chapters. Lammer focuses on Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, who is not well-known by mod-
ern scholars. He also provides – in an appendix – the Arabic text with a facing English 
translation. At the beginning of his chapter, Lammer goes back to Greek philosophy, 
namely Plato and Aristotle, which I agree is a necessary method for some topics, especially 
if we consider the transmission of knowledge as a process. Then he moves to the writings 
of philosophers in the Arabic tradition. Lammer’s clear investigation on Amidi as a figure 
of the Avicennian tradition results in this interesting chapter in which we find his views 
of time, such as whether it is considered as a substance, and whether time is the 
                                                      
2 I have in fact found something similar when comparing Avicenna’s Kitab al-Nabat to Nicolaus Dam-
ascenus’s De plantis. 
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magnitude of existence or the magnitude of motion. Thus the questions he responds to 
would be ‘what is time?’ and ‘how does it act?’.  
Cristina Cerami draws attention to al-Andalus, especially to Averroes. Hers is the 
longest chapter in this volume, and it deals with the most diverse topics: Averroes’s and 
Avicenna’s views on Physica, De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione and Meteorologica. Just 
like the human mind easily pursues a two-folded way of thinking, also medieval Islamic 
geography was divided into at least two parts: the Mashriq in the East, dominated by the 
followers of Avicenna, and the Maghreb in the West, dominated by those of Averroes. If 
we consider Avicenna as a synthesizer – which is quite apparent in his al-Qanun fi al-Tibb 
– then we should think of Averroes as the figure defending a ‘pure philosophy’ in regard 
to Aristotle and even a ‘pure medicine’ drawing on Galen. This was probably the reason 
Averroes targeted Avicenna, to strengthen pure falasifa, and sought to invalidate al-Gaz-
ali’s allegations against philosophy. As Cerami points out, Averroes’s new reading of Ar-
istotle began in the late 1160s. The table she provides to compare Averroes’s criticism and 
her explanations are indeed useful for further study.  
Resianne Fontaine authors one of the two chapters on the Hebrew reception of Avi-
cenna’s Physics. Her chapter is entitled Avicennian Sources in Abraham Ibn Daud’s Natural Phi-
losophy. She aims to shed light on the issue by contextualising and problematizing the 
question of Ibn Daud’s use of sources. Directly or indirectly, she puts forward that Ibn 
Daud became acquainted with Avicennian doctrines and his theory of emanation. How-
ever, she questions the availability of Avicennian texts in Andalusia, especially in Toledo. 
Nevertheless, as the reader may easily detect, Fontaine does not provide good evidence 
on whether Ibn Daud read Avicennian texts (either in Arabic or in Hebrew). Fontaine tries 
to solve the problem of Avicennian knowledge without Avicenna. To do this, she com-
pares the terminology of some passages. In my opinion, her conclusions are not as strong 
as needed for her claims. 
Gad Fraudenthal is the author of the eighth chapter and he turns the reception of 
Avicenna into a dilemma: between bold naturalism and fideist literalism. He first focuses on 
one of the most radical of medieval Jewish thinkers, Samuel ibn Tibbon, who in his words 
‘is one of the few true Avicennians in the history of medieval Jewish thought’. Fraunden-
thal uses the issue of ‘gathering of the waters’ in medieval Jewish philosophy as a litmus 
test to distinguish naturalists, semi-naturalists, traditionalists and so on. In addition to 
Samuel ibn Tibbon, Fraudenthal examines a list of mediaeval Jewish philosophers, focus-
ing on their reception of Ibn Tibbon’s Avicennian hypothesis. This chapter is also helpful 
for understanding the naturalistic views in medieval philosophy regarding the question 
of whether we should solve cosmological puzzles by using natural philosophy or Scrip-
ture. The spiritual and social dangers Maimonides warned us about are valid for any reli-
gion which motivates believers through miracles. As Fraudenthal implies, this is a matter 
of the ‘level of naturalism’ (p. 306). In other words, to what extent are we naturalists? In 
this chapter, Fraudenthal also knits a texture where we find Jewish medieval philosophy 
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fully embracing Avicenna’s natural history of the universe and showing that it was un-
derstood as something in conformity with Scripture.  
Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Andreas Büttner are the authors of the most technical chap-
ter of this volume. This chapter is about some anonymous translations from Arabic into 
Latin composed in the twelfth century in the Iberian Peninsula, and its purpose is to iden-
tify the translators. To this effect, Hasse proceeds by philological analysis (p. 321), 
whereas Büttner focuses on computational stylometry (p. 357). The work is based on the 
idea that a comparison of words or small phrases which appear often in the texts of dif-
ferent (known and unknown) translators, would yield some statistical data which would 
be useful for us in attributing a connection between a known translator and the transla-
tion. After some calibrations and precisions, the authors, aware of their limits, present a 
modest table in conclusion. Apparently, this is the result of teamwork which was also 
supported by many collaborators. The methodology of studies like this one should be 
taken as a model for some historical studies in philosophy and science. Since I myself have 
used some ‘similarity analysis’ and ‘clustering’ methods in my biological studies, I value 
such interdisciplinary methods and works. I truly admire both authors for this work. 
The first chapter about the Latin reception of Avicenna is authored by Katrin Fischer, 
who discusses the Avicennian influence on William of Auvergne’s Primum magisterium. 
William of Auvergne had access to the Latin translation of Avicenna’s writings on meta-
physics and psychology. After showing William of Auvergne’s rejection of Avicenna’s the-
ory of emanation, Fischer compares the authors in order to show the parallels between 
them. William of Auvergne is closer to Avicenna than to Aristotle both in content and 
terminology, and his theory of potentia was inspired by Avicenna. Fischer also covers Av-
icenna’s influence on Auvergne’s theory of causes and enumerates the attempts and ef-
forts he made in order to distinguish and characterize the types of efficient causes, in-
cluding necessary and voluntary causes. William of Auvergne also introduced some con-
cepts to leave enough space for nature, humans and God to operate as actors in causality.  
Amos Bertolacci studies Albert the Great’s harmonizing strategy (p. 400) to mediate 
between Averroes’s and Avicenna’s contrasting positions. This strategy has, according to 
Bertolacci, three levels: material, stylistic and doctrinal. Bertolacci discusses each of these 
levels in separate sections, and concludes that especially the doctrinal strategy shows a 
switch in reliance from Avicenna to Averroes. In other words, Albert went from a phase 
of stronger Avicennian influence to a stage of a more marked Ibn Rushdian one (p. 417). 
Bertolacci – as a comment – adds that Albert had to acknowledge the importance of Aver-
roes as a very helpful tool for understanding Aristotle. The Latin debate over the relative 
merits of Averroes and Avicenna is a long one, and the Doctor Universalis was involved 
in these discussions. In this regard, I would note that Averroes was not targeting Avicenna 
just to attack him, but because his purpose was the purification of Aristotelian philoso-
phy, which was the true philosophy for him. 
Cecilia Trifogli studies Roger Bacon who, unlike his contemporaries, more frequently 
refers to Avicenna’s Physics. Bacon’s Communa naturalium has some parallels with 
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Avicenna’s Physics regarding the presentation and the discussion of the Aristotelian ma-
terial. However, Bacon tended to make more references to Avicenna’s Metaphysics than to 
his Physics in this work. This was probably because his main interest was to be found in 
the fundamentals of physics. After some qualitative data, Trifogli has an attractive con-
clusion, which is that ‘in Bacon’s view, Avicenna has more authority as a life-scientist than 
as a physicist’ (p. 435). Bacon has Avicenna as the implicit starting point and the explicit 
end point in his discussions. To have Avicenna on his side, Bacon even denies that Avi-
cenna was a supporter of some controversial views, but was merely a reporter of them (p. 
448). It is interesting to read that Bacon applies a kind of exegetical technique to Avi-
cennian texts, which is a witness to his deep knowledge of Avicennian thought.  
Jean-Marc Mandosio is the author of the last chapter of the Latin section and of the 
volume. In this chapter, Mandosio studies Alfred Sareshill (Sareshell) and Avicenna’s me-
teorology. The author mentions some studies on early modern and medieval meteorol-
ogy, and how the interest in them is growing. Mandosio explicitly shows how Alfred of 
Sareshill eliminated some details in order to adapt the material so that the Latin reader 
would enjoy a de-orientalised text. This chapter touches on more physical phenomena in 
context, and it includes several citations to ancient observations about nature. I would 
like to add that in fact the interest in history of natural phenomena and in natural philos-
ophy is increasing. For instance, a Pseudo-Aristotelian text Kitab al-Ahǧar has recently 
been the subject of study of a postgraduate degree in Turkey. I do not however under-
stand why the author choses ‘lofty impressions’ as translation of «al-Athar al-Ulwiyya» 
which could provide better translation. Nevertheless, the comparison of Avicenna’s and 
Aristotle’s parallel chapters in a list is very useful for the reader and constitutes a sample 
of how Avicenna re-arranged Aristotelian titles and content.  
I highly recommend this fantastic work, especially for those interested in history of 
philosophy (Arabic, Hebrew or Latin) or history of science. Its only weak point is perhaps 
that it includes only two chapters on the Hebrew tradition. It would be nice to see this 
volume followed by another one focusing on the reception of Avicenna’s writings on 
plants and animals. 
 
